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INTRODUCTION

The August 2020 Belarusian Presidential Election caused political
unrest after President Alexander Lukashenko controversially won reelection
by earning over eighty percent of the vote.1 Lukashenko’s opponent, Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya, disputed the results and claimed victory, but Lukashenko
exiled her immediately after the election.2 The people of Belarus took to the
streets in mass to protest Tikhanovaskaya’s exile and demanded for
Lukashenko’s resignation.3 In response to the protests, Lukashenko secretly
moved up his inauguration from November to late September while arresting
thousands of opposition leaders and protesters.4 Lukashenko has not yet
indicated any intention of stepping down, but in December he made a general
promise to the people to amend the Belarusian Constitution.5 The opposition
ultimately rejected Lukashenko’s proposed amendment as a tactic to end the
protests.6 To this day, the protests continue and Belarusian police have
detained over 30,000 protesters since they began.7
Not only was the response to the election met with internal unrest,
but the international community also pressured Lukashenko to step down.
Immediately following the election, the European Union opposed
Lukashenko’s reelection and called for Belarus to release the ballot counts. 8
Lukashenko responded by closing Belarus’s western border, which is shared
with several EU Member States, and blamed the origins of the protests on the
West.9 After Lukashenko’s adversarial response and his crackdown against
protesters, both the EU and U.S. decided to stop recognizing Lukashenko as

1

Timeline of Election Turmoil in Belarus, RTE (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.rte.ie/news/newslens/2020/0811/1158602-belarus/.
2 See id. (reporting that Tikhanovaskaya was compelled to flee to Lithuania for her
children’s sake).
3 Id.
4 Yuras Karmanau, Belarus President Sworn in at Unannounced Inaugural Ceremony, AP
(Sept. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/alexander-lukashenko-belarus-inaugurationselections-minsk-c1d91895962eab5120e1dd2ae5fb2b16.
5 Thousands of Protesters March in Belarus, Dozens Detained, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 6, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/6/belarus-opposition-rallies-in-latest-protestamid-arrests.
6 RFE/RL’s Belarus Service, As Belarus Protests Enter Sixth Month, Lukashenka Repeats
Vague Promise of Change, RADIOFREEEUR. RADIOLIBERTY (Jan. 10, 2021, 15:42 GMT),
https://www.rferl.org/a/as-belarus-protests-enter-sixth-month-lukashenka-repeats-vaguepromise-of-change/31040652.html.
7 Id.
8 Timeline of Election Turmoil in Belarus, supra note 1.
9 Belarus President Closes Western Borders, Puts Army on High Alert, ALJAZEERA (Sept.
17, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/17/belarus-president-closes-westernborders-puts-army-on-high-alert/.
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the legitimate president of Belarus.10 Due to the ongoing unrest, it is unclear
whether the West will exert any more pressure on Lukashenko to force his
resignation.
Any further action from the West likely depends on the response from
Belarus’s closest ally—Russia. The two states became politically and
economically intertwined, considering Belarus was originally part of the
Soviet Union, fueling discussions about integrating the two states in the late
1990s, but they have somewhat drifted apart since.11 For years, Belarus and
Russia have been constantly bickering over oil and natural gas prices, and
Russia felt especially betrayed when Belarus remained neutral during the
2014 Ukrainian Crisis.12 Nevertheless, Russia backed Lukashenko after the
controversial 2020 Election result and continues to recognize him as the
official sitting president of Belarus.13 In addition, Russia offered Belarus a
$1.5 billion loan to keep Belarus’s economy afloat during the unrest. 14 It is
possible that Russia’s offer to send special forces to Belarus may alarm the
West seeing that the last time Russia sent troops to an Eastern European
neighbor was to Ukraine in 2014, which caused more unrest and led to the
Russian annexation of Crimea.15
The current Belarusian instability could help Russia expand its
influence throughout Eastern Europe and create more conflict between Russia
10

Dave Lawler, U.S. No Longer Recognizes Lukashenko as Legitimate President of
Belarus, AXIOS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.axios.com/us-lukashenko-president-belarus353ed235-98f7-446f-919a-6a6cdab81975.html.
11 Yauheni Preiherman, Can Belarus Become a Success Story of European Security?, EUR.
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.
(Feb.
21,
2019),
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_can_belarus_become_a_success_story_of_europ
ean_security (In 1999, Russia and Belarus signed the Union State treaty and agreed to stay
sovereign while coordinating economic and foreign security policies. But since that treaty,
they have drifted apart because “Minsk and Moscow have different understandings about
what it means to be allies.”); A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition,
Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Belarus, OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/countries/belarus (last visited Sept. 30, 2021) (That
Belarus had previously been a constituent republic of USSR).
12 See id. (stating that Russian officials thought Belarus’s neutral stance in the RussianUkrainian conflict went “against Russia’s interests,” and that Belarus should have stood by
Moscow as it experienced increased Western pressures).
13 Shaun Walker, Belarus: Lukashenko Vows to Stay in First Interview Since Protests, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/08/belaruslukashenko-vows-to-stay-in-first-interview-since-protests (As support for Lukashenko and
recognition of his presidency, “Putin . . . promised to send a contingent of special forces to
Belarus to prop up Lukashenko’s rule if necessary.”).
14 Belarus President Closes Western Borders, Puts Army on High Alert, supra note 9.
15 Adam Twardowski, The Return of Novorossiya: Why Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine
Exposes the Weakness of International Law, 24 MINN. J. INT'L L. 351, 352 (2015) (Russia’s
annexation of Crimea raised the likelihood of a protracted geopolitical standoff and
denigration of international legal norms designed to provide consultative processes for the
diffusion of interstate tensions).

2021]

UNREST IN BELARUS

197

and the West. With Belarus under Russian control, there would be less buffer
between Russia and its former satellite states-turned EU members, such as
Poland and the Baltic States.16 The takeover would also give Russia more
control over oil and natural gas pipelines running through Eastern Europe,
expanding its economic grasp on the region.17 In this event, the West would
likely push back against any Russian aggression, but the West’s sanctions
against Russia during the annexation of Crimea in 2014 barely harmed the
Russian economy, indicating a Western response is unlikely to deter Russia.18
This Note will examine the roles of both Russia and the West in creating an
unstable Belarus ripe for Russian takeover. On the Russian side, this Note will
mostly focus on the 1999 Union State Treaty that partially unified Russia and
Belarus, which could provide the Russian legal justification for integrating the
two states.19 It will also examine the legal justifications Russia used to annex
Crimea in 2014, such as the right to protect ethnic Russians outside of its
borders, to determine if they will attempt to justify aggression in Belarus on
the same grounds.20
Regarding Western relations with Belarus, this Note will analyze
policies implemented against Belarus that pulled Belarus closer to Russia. The
implementation of these sanctions, such as the Belarus Democracy Acts
implemented by the United States, pushed Belarus into the hands of Russia
and opens the door for possible integration as soon as Lukashenko loses
control of the state.21 This Note will also examine the Western response to
Russian aggression in Ukraine and argue that the West’s failure to impose
significant sanctions on Russia will fail to deter Russia from pursuing any
future aggression in Belarus. This potential takeover will only further
destabilize Eastern Europe and create more tension between Russia and the
West.

16

Belarus President Closes Western Borders, Puts Army on High Alert, supra note 14.
See Nikola Mikovic, How Russia Benefited from Belarus’s Turmoil, INTERPRETER (Sept.
7, 2020), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-russia-benefited-belarusturmoil (discussing Belarus’s dependence on Russia for oil and natural gas).
18 Twardowski, supra note 15, at 360 & 382.
19 Preiherman, supra note 11.
20 Twardoski, supra note 15, at 366.
21 See Claire M. Diallo, The U.S. Empire: Is Any Sovereign Nation Safe After the Russian
and Belarus Democracy Acts?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 673, 677 (2006) (discussing the
illegitimacy of the Russian and Belarus Democracy Acts).
17
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BELARUS BACKGROUND

A. Belarusian-Russian Relations Post USSR Dissolution and the 1999
Union State Treaty
Located in Eastern Europe on the western border of Russia, Belarus
gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.22 Belarus held its first
presidential election in 1994 and elected Alexander Lukashenko. 23
Lukashenko has served as the President ever since, and the 1994 election was
allegedly the only free and fair election the state ever conducted. 24 During his
tenure as President, Lukashenko imposed authoritarian measures, such as
abolishing the Belarusian Parliament, to restrict the political and civil rights
of his people.25 The Belarusian people’s political and civil rights have
drastically decreased over Lukashenko’s twenty-six year tenure in office, as
Belarus has the worst human rights record in Europe.26
Although Belarus gained its independence in 1991, Belarus has
remained closely tied to Russia since its independence. Belarus is a young
state, lacking both a national identity and the history of pre-Soviet
independence enjoyed by the other Baltic States.27 This lack of identity
allowed Lukashenko to develop Belarus into essentially a Soviet Satellite after
he took office in 1994.28 For example, Lukashenko changed the Belarusian
flag to resemble the Soviet-era flag.29 He also made Russian an official
language along with Belarusian and strongly discouraged the use of
Belarusian by conducting governmental operations mostly in Russian.30 This
cultural integration in the 1990s caused Russia to act as Belarus’s closest ally
both politically and economically, which led to discussions of integration. 31
After a series of bilateral treaties in the late 1990s, Russia and Belarus signed
22 Belarus, CENT. INTEL. AGENCY: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-

factbook/countries/belarus/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2021).
23 Id.
24 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Relations with Belarus: Bilateral
Relations Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.state.gov/u-srelations-with-belarus/; Belarus, supra note 22 (Belarus’s July 1994 election was the
country's first and only direct election).
25 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, supra note 24.
26
See
Freedom
in the World 2020: Belarus, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2020 (last visited Sept. 16,
2021) (rating the political and civil rights of Belarus a 19 out of 100 based on multiple
categories on political and civil rights, which was the worst score in Europe).
27
Jeffrey Mankoff, Will Belarus Be the Next Ukraine? Why the Brewing Conflict between
Moscow and Minsk Is Bad News, FOREIGN AFFS. (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/belarus/2020-02-05/will-belarus-be-next-ukraine.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Preiherman, supra note 11.

2021]

UNREST IN BELARUS

199

the Union State Agreement in 1999.32 The Agreement established the
infrastructure for a potential complete integration between the two states.
The Union State Agreement served as a promising “new stage in the
process of the unification of the peoples of the two countries.”33 However, the
Agreement emphasized the importance of state sovereignty and required the
consent of Belarus for adopting any future measures implemented by the
Union State.34 Also, the Agreement explicitly stated that the two states would
retain sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, state structure,
constitutions, state flags, coats of arms, and other attributes of statehood. 35
The Union State Agreement sought to balance the unification
interests and the sovereignty interests of Belarus and Russia by dividing the
governance structure into two categories: sole responsibility powers and joint
responsibility powers.36 These divisions of responsibility indicated when the
Union State would work unilaterally and when the member states must assist
the Union State. Sole responsibility gave the exclusive power to the Union
State, while joint responsibility required the member states to work with the
Union State.37
Most of the sole responsibility powers were economic in nature and
included establishing common markets, creating a single-tax system,
establishing a unified currency, and developing a common trade and customs
policy in relation to other international actors.38 Although most of the sole
responsibility powers were economic, some sole responsibilities of the Union
State were more dynamic. These dynamic sole responsibilities included some
significant foreign policy powers, such as creating a unified border policy,
operating regional troops, and engaging in defense contracts.39
In contrast, joint responsibility mostly gave the Union State the power
for future expansion by creating mechanisms that allowed other states to
eventually join the Union State.40 These powers included admitting other
states into the Union State, coordinating foreign policy regarding treaties,
ensuring rights for citizens throughout the Union State, and environmental
protections.41 Because joint responsibilities implemented potential future
32

Yauheni Preiherman, Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State of Belarus and
Russia,
MINSK
DIALOGUE
(Apr.
1,
2019),
https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/memorable-notes/treaty-on-the-establishment-ofthe-union-state-of-belarus-and-russia.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36
Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See generally id (providing a list of the joint responsibilities of the members of the Union
State).
41 Id.
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membership and gave the Union State powers similar to the goals of larger
international organizations, these provisions indicated that the signatories
intended the Union State to develop into a large international organization
likely consisting of former Soviet satellites.42
Although the Union State Agreement protected the sovereignty of
Belarus, the Agreement appeared as a way Russia could eventually reunify
with Belarus. The unification of economies and many social policies and the
coordination on foreign policy and bilateral defense make it difficult to
determine how a state remains sovereign after losing the unilateral power to
make these decisions. Also, some of the long-term goals of the Agreement
included a unified parliament, one currency, and a potential constitution.43
The two states never fully implemented the Agreement and by the
mid-2000s Belarus and Russia ended talks of forming a Union State.44 Russia
ultimately did not fully implement the Agreement because the Union State
required Belarusian approval on every policy presented before the Union
State.45 Lukashenko demanded that the Agreement include the consent
provision because of his opposition to giving up state sovereignty, and a
bilateral agreement of this magnitude with Russia would likely have led to
Russia absorbing Belarus if there was not a consent provision.46 Because
Russia did not want to give up so much power to its significantly-smaller
former satellite, it decided to hold off.47
The states’ failure to fully implement the Agreement indicates that
Russia likely attempted to mask its takeover and use the Agreement to regain
lost territory. The Agreement was not a fully-cooperative bilateral agreement
because Russia was uncomfortable giving Belarus too much power within the
Agreement. With Belarus in turmoil and thousands of protesters calling for
Lukashenko’s resignation, Russia could force Lukashenko into a Russiafriendly Union State Agreement in exchange for protection from a western
intervention or a governmental overthrow by the Belarusian people.

42

Id.
Id.
44 ANAIS MARIN, T HE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA: MYTHS AND REALITIES OF
POLITICAL-MILITARY
INTEGRATION,
3
(2020),
https://vilniusinstitute.lt/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Anais-Marin-Union-State-of-Belarus-and-Russia.pdf.
45Id. at 4.
46 Id.
47 Id.
43
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B. Belarusian-Russian Relations Post Union State Agreement
Deal talks for the Union State dissolved shortly after they began. In
2002, Lukashenko delayed the unification as much as possible after Vladimir
Putin made it clear the only way for the deal to move further was a complete
unification of Belarus and Russia.48 However, this failure to adopt the Union
State did not prevent the two states from remaining close economically and
politically. Presently, the two states are both members of the Eurasian
Economic Union and are major trading partners, as Russia accounts for nearly
forty-eight percent of Belarusian foreign trade.49 Belarus and Russia also
conduct joint military exercises every few years and have various bilateral
agreements regarding military cooperation.50
Even though the two states have remained close allies, Belarus and
Russia have had multiple disagreements throughout the twenty-first century.
These disputes primarily arose in two different areas: negotiation of energy
prices between the two states and Russian aggression throughout Eastern
Europe.51
The ongoing energy dispute between Belarus and Russia is over a
decade long and remains at an impasse.52 Russia is a major oil exporter to
Belarus, and Russia also runs a major natural gas pipeline through Belarus.53
Lukashenko often requested discounts on Russian oil for the domestic price,
but Russia asserted they would not discount oil for Belarus until they officially
joined Russia as a Union State.54 However, between 2005 and 2015, Russia
gave Belarus discounts on energy and loans ranging from eleven to twentyseven percent of the Belarusian GDP. 55 Russia drastically decreased its
48

Id. at 3.
Belarus and Russia, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELR.,
https://www.mfa.gov.by/en/bilateral/russia/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
50 Id.
51 See Mikovic, supra note 17 (recounting attempts by Russia and Belarus to resolve
disagreements concerning oil subsidies and Russian military presence in Belarus); see also
Pritish Gupta, Russia-Belarus Relations: The Future of the Union State, OBSERVER RSCH.
FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russia-belarus-relationsfuture-union-state-65288/ (discussing Belarus’s loss of Russian oil subsidies and their
refusal to accept a Russian Air Force base).
52 Gupta, supra note 51.
53 Justin Clune, The Natural Gas Trade between the Russian Federation and the European
Union: Power Dynamics, Legal Challenges, and a Country Caught in the Middle, 35 NW.
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 199, 203 (2014).
54
ARSENY SIVITSKY, BELARUS – RUSSIA: FROM A STRATEGIC DEAL TO AN INTEGRATION
ULTIMATUM, 2-3 (2019), https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/rfp3sivitsky.pdf (Minsk and Moscow had conflicting views regarding the Union State. Belarus
refused to make concessions that would undermine its sovereignty. Russia was defiant that
it will not make concessions on preserving integration subsidies unless Belarus gave up its
independence and sovereignty).
55 Id. at 6.
49
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discounts in 2015, which severely hurt the Belarusian economy.56 Russia took
this a step further in 2018 by implementing a tax maneuver that created a
mineral extraction tax on originally duty-free Russian crude oil that Russia
exported to Belarus.57 By 2025, this tax will cause losses amounting to
approximately one-sixth of Belarus’s GDP, and Russia’s economic pressure
on Belarus may force the states to integrate.58 Because the unrest after the
2020 election significantly weakened the Belarusian economy even further,
Russia’s new oil taxes will exponentially hurt Belarus as the unrest
continues.59
The two states also acted adversely regarding foreign policy,
especially during times of unrest within the region. Most of this unrest was in
response to Russian aggression when Russia attempted to expand its influence
into South Ossetia and Ukraine.60 Violence broke out in both conflicts and the
West condemned Russia’s actions.61 Instead of supporting Russia, Belarus
remained neutral throughout these conflicts, and Lukashenko even backed
NATO rhetorically.62 In maintaining Belarus’s neutral position, Lukashenko
focused on the importance of state sovereignty, which he preserved by putting
off the Union State Agreement for two decades.63 This neutrality stance and
pro-Western rhetoric helped Lukashenko convince the West to lift sanctions
on Belarus in 2015.64 Russian aggression throughout the region likely made
Lukashenko nervous, thus, to protect Belarus from becoming Russia’s next
invasion target, Lukashenko outwardly supported state sovereignty instead of
the Russian aggression.
From the Russian perspective, Belarus’s neutral stance is a betrayal
by one of Russia’s closest allies.65 Their differences in foreign policy have put
Belarus’s position as Russia’s top ally in jeopardy, and consequentially
Belarus felt the impact both economically and militarily.66 Russia recently
stopped giving Belarus discounts on weapons and aircrafts, and in some
instances refused to sell Belarus weapons at all.67 Russia’s halt in weapon
sales to Belarus caused Belarus’s military to decay and made Belarus more

56

Id.
Id. at 12.
58 Id.
59 See Mikovic, supra note 17 (explaining that Belarus was supposed to receive about 24
million tonnes of Russian oil in 2020 and 2021 and that if the Kremlin did not provide a
significant discount the Belarusian economy would suffer).
60 MARIN, supra note 44, at 3 & 8.
61
Id. at 9.
62 Id. at 8.
63 Id. at 10.
64 Id. at 9.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1 & 9.
67 Id. at 11.
57

2021]

UNREST IN BELARUS

203

dependent on Russian military support.68 As a result, Lukashenko is forced to
rely on the Russian military if any future violence breaks out, and may even
have to allow Russia to establish a military base in Belarus. 69 Russia is the
only state backing Lukashenko during the current unrest, so Lukashenko may
have no choice but to fall in line with Russia, possibly to the point of full
integration between the two states.
The economic, political, and military ties between Belarus and
Russia indicate the two states are vastly interconnected. However, this
connection is mostly one-sided because Russia holds most of its power and
resources over the head of its former state.70 This strong connection between
Belarus and Russia has made it difficult for Belarus to break free from Russian
influence because Russia would often withhold preferential treatment if
Belarus made attempts to expand its international network.71 The forced
dependence on Russia, along with Russia’s economic pressure on Belarus,
could give Lukashenko no choice but to revive a Union State Agreement.
Especially with his power being threatened by uprisings, Lukashenko may
turn to his only ally in Russia to keep himself afloat, even at the cost of state
sovereignty.
C. Belarusian-Western Relations and Their International Agreements
The adversarial nature of the relationship between Belarus and the
West prevented Belarus from expanding its international network, making
Belarus more dependent on Russia. This negative relationship with the West
began almost as soon as Lukashenko took power. In 1996, shortly after
Lukashenko took office, he faced Western criticism after he held a referendum
that dissolved the Belarusian Parliament.72 Shortly after the referendum,
Lukashenko suspended all U.S. and EU ambassadors from Belarus.73
Between the U.S. and EU, the U.S. had a more adversarial
relationship with Belarus. After the 1996 incident with Western ambassadors,
the next major interaction between the U.S. and Belarus occurred in 2004

68

Id.
Id.
70 See SIVITSKY, supra note 54, at 2 (explaining that the 1999 Treaty on the Creation of a
Union State of Russia and Belarus was premised on a principle of equality which is yet to
be realized due to conflicting interests including Russia’s interests to undermine the
national sovereignty and independence of Belarus).
71
See MARIN, supra note 44, at 1 (When Belarus refused to side with Russia in its ongoing
confrontation with Ukraine and the West, Russia became dissatisfied with this failing
loyalty, and consequentially has been cutting oil subsidies since 2015, making the
resumption of financial support contingent upon the Belarusian leadership committing to
deeper economic, political, and military integration within the Union State).
72 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, supra note 24.
73 Id.
69
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when Congress passed the Belarus Democracy Act.74 This Act intended to
promote democracy in Belarus by providing funding to pro-democratic
opposition groups within Belarus and sanctioning the Lukashenko regime.75
Originally, the Act was supposed to last for two years, but Belarus made no
progress in becoming a democracy within that time.76
Accordingly, in 2006, President Bush issued an Executive Order that
continued U.S. sanctions against Belarus.77 Congress reauthorized the
Democracy Act later that year.78 Although the U.S. removed sanctions against
Belarus in 2008, the U.S. reimposed sanctions in 2011 after Lukashenko
allegedly rigged his 2010 Presidential Election.79 The U.S. reinstated these
sanctions by repassing the Democracy Act in 2011 and these sanctions are
still in place today.80
In passing the Democracy Act, the U.S. declared Belarus a threat to
national security and justified funding opposition groups and freezing
Belarusian assets with IEEPA and the Foreign Commerce Clause.81 Even with
this legal justification, the Democracy Act created a permanent strain between
the U.S. and Belarus because Belarus believed the U.S. funding opposition
groups was an attempt to undermine Belarusian sovereignty. 82 Belarus also
believed that the Act breached the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, where
former USSR Republics including Belarus surrendered their nuclear weapons
in exchange for the U.S. promise not to coerce them politically or
economically.83
After initial attempts at cooperation failed, the EU, just like the U.S.,
sanctioned Belarus, but it subsequently removed the sanctions in 2008 and
invited Belarus to join the Eastern Partnership Initiative. 84 The Eastern
Partnership Initiative was an attempt to improve relations between the EU and
former USSR Republics through political, economic, and societal

74

Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-347, 118 Stat. 1383.
Id. §§ 2, 3.
76 Ilya Zlatkin, Opportunistic Discipline: Using Eurasian Integration to Improve Sanctions
Against Belarus, 11 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 291, 295 (2012).
77 Exec. Order No. 13405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 16, 2006).
78 Zlatkin, supra note 76.
79 Id. at 295-96.
80 Id. at 297.
81 Id.
82
See Diallo, supra note 21, at 682 & 688 (In reaction to the Democracy Acts, a Belarusian
interior ministry spokesman stated that the Acts deny the Belarusian people's aspiration
towards a stable and sovereign state. In a warning tone, the spokesman further stated that
Belarus reserves the right to retaliate in response to the U.S. passing of the Democracy
Acts).
83 Zlatkin, supra note 76, at 298.
84 Id. at 295-296.
75
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integration.85 The EU also reimplemented sanctions after 2011, but
maintained an economic relationship with Belarus through the Eastern
Partnership because Belarus accounted for about one-third of EU trade.86
Before new restrictions were imposed on Belarus after their 2020 Presidential
Election, the former EU sanctions against Belarus were mostly symbolic but
Lukashenko often expressed his opposition to the sanctions.87
Since Belarus became a state, its relationship with the West has
remained mostly adversarial. Although the EU and Belarus developed an
economic relationship through the Eastern Partnership, Lukashenko’s poor
human rights record and the EU’s continued sanctions on one of Belarus’s
major trading partners keep the two parties at odds. The sanctions, along with
the U.S. funding groups that opposed the Belarusian government, made
Belarus skeptical of dealing with the West and fostered Belarus’s dependence
on Russia even further. The West essentially pushed Belarus towards Russia
with various rounds of sanctions and left Belarus exposed to possible Russian
aggression.
III.

THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS OF 2014 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON BELARUS

To determine Russia’s potential strategy for expanding into Belarus,
it is significant to examine the last time Russia used force to annex territory
from an Eastern European neighbor, which occurred during the 2014
Ukrainian Crisis. The turmoil in Ukraine began in November 2013 after its
President, Viktor Yanukovych, refused to sign an association agreement with
the EU.88 The Ukrainian people protested his refusal which led to the ouster
of President Yanukovych.89 However, not all of the protesters were pro-EU;
pro-Russia groups used the unrest to help Russia increase its influence on
Ukraine.90 After the overthrow of Yanukovych in February 2014, troops
resembling Russian military yet lacking identification began seizing parts of

85

European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Eastern Partnership,
EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/easternpartnership_en (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
86 20 Deliverables for 2020: Bringing Tangible Results for Citizens, E. P’SHIP,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44362/20-deliverables-for-2020.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2021).
87 Yauheni Preiherman, Belarus and the EU: Where Could Another Rapprochement Lead?,
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2020, 5:49 PM), https://jamestown.org/program/belarusand-the-eu-where-could-another-rapprochement-lead/.
88
Christian Marxsen, Die Krimkrise: Eine Völkerrechtliche Perspektive [The Crimea
Crisis: An International Law Perspective], 74 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZaöRV] 367, 368 – 369 (2014) (Ger.),
https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/Marxsen_2014_-_The_crimea_crisis__an_international_law_perspective.pdf.
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Crimea.91 By March 2014, the Russian military asserted its control over
Crimea and held a referendum, where the majority of citizens chose to join
Russia rather than restore the 1992 Crimean Constitution.92 The international
community heavily criticized and deemed the referendum unfair because
ninety-seven percent of votes were in favor of joining Russia.93 The Ukrainian
takeover is significant because it demonstrates both the potential legal
justifications Russia could use if it unifies with Belarus and the potential
Western response to Belarus-Russia unification. It also serves as evidence of
Russia’s desire to unify with Belarus because unification will help Russia
protect its Ukrainian interests and solidify Russia’s control of Eastern
Europe.94
A. Russian Legal Justifications for Annexation
By sending unmarked troops to Ukraine and using military force to
annex Crimea, Russia violated the UN Charter, the 1994 Treaty of Budapest
regarding Non-Proliferation, and many bilateral agreements that assured the
sovereignty of Ukraine.95 Russia attempted to justify the military action by
asserting its treaties with Ukraine were no longer binding because the old
government that made the treaties had been overthrown.96 This argument had
no basis in international law, so Russia asserted two alternative justifications
for its military takeover.97 The first justification was that Russia wanted to
protect its nationals abroad, and the second was intervention upon invitation.98
The first legal justification for military intervention was that Russia
was entitled to use force to protect its nationals abroad.99 Russia asserted that
a significant percentage of residents in Crimea were Russian, and thus it had
a right to defend them under the UN Charter or an unwritten customary
exception for the use of force.100 The UN Charter only provides the right to
self-defense in “an ongoing armed attack against a state or the threat of
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imminent attack.”101 The customary law exception only allows for a state to
rescue its own nationals.102 Since Russia was the state initiating the military
attack and the Russians in Crimea were ethnic Russians rather than Russian
citizens, neither of these self-defense justifications have merit.103
The second justification Russia asserted was intervention upon
invitation. Russia claimed that before President Yanukovych fled Ukraine, he
invited Russia to intervene.104 Russia asserted that Yanukovych still
technically had the authority to invite Russia into Ukraine to prevent an
unconstitutional transfer of power because the Ukrainian Parliament failed to
properly remove him under the Ukrainian Constitution.105 Even though
Yanukovych was technically still President, his consent was improper under
international law because when he asked Russia to intervene, he lacked any
real control of Ukraine.106 Article 29 of the International Law Commission
requires that the state consent “must be attributable to the state,” and since
Yanukovych lacked any real control over Ukraine, his consent was not
attributable to Ukraine and was therefore invalid.107 Therefore, Russia’s
second legal justification failed because it was not properly invited to
intervene.
B. Western Response to Russia’s Annexation of Crimea
The West quickly condemned Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The
U.S. and EU did not recognize the annexation of Crimea and imposed both
visa and financial sanctions on Russia.108 Specifically, the EU applied an
import ban on goods from Crimea, cancelled bilateral EU-Russia summits,
stopped supplying tourism services in Crimea, and imposed an export ban on
certain goods.109 However, these sanctions failed to deter Russia’s aggression
because the EU failed to introduce broad sanctions against Russia, nor did the
EU sanction any of Russia’s top officials.110 The EU also failed to respond to
Russia’s increased aggression in 2018 when Russia attacked Ukrainian
vessels in the region.111
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As for the United States, in 2014 the U.S. condemned Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and immediately imposed sanctions. The U.S.
sanctioned more than 735 individuals and entities after the annexation under
the authority of four executive orders.112 Since 2014, the U.S. intensified their
sanctions regime against Russia because of Russia’s adversarial actions
against the U.S. through continuing its aggression in Ukraine and supporting
regimes that openly opposed the U.S.113 Like the sanctions imposed by the
EU, the initial sanctions from the U.S. failed to change Russia’s behavior as
Russia became more aggressive in Ukraine in 2018.114 The sanctions also
failed to deter Russia’s other aggressive behavior towards the U.S., indicating
that the U.S. sanctions failed to serve their purpose. Even though the U.S.
imposed greater restrictions on Russia than did the EU, the American
sanctions towards Russia similarly lacked the efficacy to change any Russian
behavior.
IV.

ANALYSIS

As the unrest in Belarus continues to escalate, Russia may use the
instability within Belarus to expand its influence throughout Eastern Europe.
Given that Russia did not hold back in annexing Crimea, Russia could use
Belarus’s current state as an opportunity to expand its territory. It is also likely
that if the West imposes a punishment for Russian aggression in Belarus that
is similar to the sanctions they imposed on Russia after its aggression in
Ukraine, it is unlikely Russia will be deterred from action in Belarus.
Any future unification between Belarus and Russia would likely
occur through the framework of the Union State Agreement. Although the
Agreement ultimately failed in the mid-2000s, it failed because Lukashenko
wanted to protect Belarusian sovereignty, and Russia did not want to give him
equal bargaining power.115 Depending on the severity of the protests and how
much pressure the West puts on Lukashenko to resign, the only potential way
for Lukashenko to retain some power would be to enter into an agreement
with Russia at the cost of state sovereignty.
The justifications Russia provided while intervening in Ukraine
violated international law, so it is unlikely these same justifications would be
valid during a similar Russian intervention in Belarus.116 The claim for self-
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defense of its citizens is much weaker here because there are drastically fewer
Russian citizens and ethnic Russians living in Belarus than in Crimea. 117
Regarding intervention by invitation, Russia will have a stronger case
if Lukashenko asks for Russia to provide military support. Unlike in Ukraine,
Lukashenko remains the President of Belarus and has not yet fled the
country.118 The people challenging the election complicate this justification
because Lukashenko could no longer be the legitimate leader of Belarus. But
most of Belarus’s internal government, such as the military, is still backing
Lukashenko as he remains in Belarus. Thus, it remains a possibility. 119
Therefore, Russia could use intervention by invitation if Lukashenko invites
Russia into Belarus while Lukashenko still holds on to presidential power.
However, this justification is limited because the invitation would only give
Russia the power to help Lukashenko remain in power and not the power to
completely take over Belarus.120 To complete a full unification, Russia could
coerce Lukashenko into implementing a more Russian-friendly Union State
Agreement in return for Russian protection. Nevertheless, Russia may not
even use a justification because the previous response from the West to its
failed legal justifications did not do any significant harm to Russia.
The West would likely respond to this takeover but not enough to
deter Russia. The EU and U.S. already implemented massive sanctions on
Russia that failed to change Russia’s behavior, so it is unlikely that another
round of sanctions would further deter Russian aggression.121 The West must
either implement some carrot diplomacy or use force to prevent Russian
intervention. However, both options seem unlikely as they refused to use force
in Ukraine but likely do not want to remove sanctions against Russia.
Therefore, the Western response will not keep Russia out of Belarus, giving
Russia a clear path to Belarusian unification.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the unrest in Belarus continues, the door for Russian aggression
opens wider. After decades of treating Belarus like an enemy, the EU and U.S.
could have pushed Belarus right back under Russian control. Belarus became
overly dependent on Russian political and economic resources, which laid the
framework for potential integration between the two states. The West’s failure
to respond in Ukraine gave Russia the indication that another act of aggression
in Eastern Europe could pass without a significant response.
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Any Russian intervention would harm the Belarusian people because
they would likely be subjected to another authoritarian regime, like what they
are currently protesting.122 To stop Russian aggression, the West must act
before Russia has the opportunity intervene in Belarus. This act would involve
taking an active role in transitioning Belarus into a democratic state, either
through diplomatic negotiations with the current regime to give the people
more political and civil rights, or the more radical alternative, establishing
Tikhanovskaya as the President of Belarus. If the West were to leave Belarus
open to any Russian intervention, then it would allow Russia to expand its
influence in the region both politically and economically while continuing the
oppression of the Belarusian people. This expansion would threaten former
USSR Satellites, such as Poland and the Baltic States, while increasing
tensions between Russia and the West.
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